12 April 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Possible Reorganization of the
Office of Security - Addendum

1.   In my discussion paper on the possible reorgani-
zation of the Office of Security, I neglected to address
the responsibilities of the fourth major unit under the
Deputy Director of Security for Personnel Security and
Investigations--the Support Division.

2.   The Support Division would continue with most
or all of the responsibilities that are presently assigned
to the Operational Support Division. In addition to this,
25X1C ██████████████████ would be assigned to this unit, and
Support Division would be providing help and assistance to
Staff employees on a 24 hours a day basis. The overall
orientation would go from "operational" support to the
Clandestine Services, to all types of support to all ele-
ments of the Agency. There would be direct contact with
███████████████████████████████████approach, of   25X1C
responding rather than delegating, would have to persist.
25X1A A lot of the Security Research Staff functions, as it
relates to special inquiries for CI Staff, Angus Thuermer,
Walter Pforzheimer, etc., would be handled by this Division.
Again, the name of the game would be "support" in the broad
sense of the term, not merely support to operations.

3.   I have already indicated that the selection of
right people will be very important if the reorganization
is to work properly. This would definitely be the situation
with respect to the Support Division, because it would have
to combine the best of DDS/PS and DDS/IOS. As has already
been indicated, the Deputy might have some specific area of
responsibility, so that there is a good balance between the
philosophies of Personnel Security Division and the existing
Operational Support Division.

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Acting Executive Officer

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 008246

Discussion Paper on the Possible
Reorganization of the Office of Security

1. Attached herewith as Tab A is an Office of
Security organizational structure which incorporates a
number of proposed changes which might take place over
a period of time. The primary emphasis is on combining
DDS/IOS with DDS/PS, whereas no significant change is
suggested in the third large component, DDS/PTOS. Tab B
is a background study on the historical growth of the
Office of Security from an organizational structure stand-
point.

2. The following would be the most important
changes from a management or philosophical standpoint:

A. There would be a Deputy Director of
Security for Personnel Security and Investigations
(DD/PSI), with four divisions coming within his
sphere of authority.

B. Personnel Security Division would be
responsible for all types of clearances and
approvals issued by the Office of Security.
This would cover both "covert and overt" cases,
external and internal, staff type and operational.
It would include all categories of industrial
clearances, and all categories of codeword clear-
ances. The name of the game would be "clearance."

C. Investigations and Polygraph Division
would combine the two principal information or
fact gathering components. The key point is
that this Division would have no clearance respon-
sibilities, there would be no appraisal function,
but IPD would have the mission in life of pulling
together a complete package of material, whether
the data is acquired through investigative or
technical means. (At first blush, the polygraph
and investigative functions do not appear to mesh,
but the polygraph function overlaps into a number
of areas, and the TO is now so small, it would be
difficult to keep it as a separate Division). Com-
bining IRD and ID might have some advantages by
encouraging cross fertilization and the development
of generalists rather than interrogation specialists,
or even investigative specialists.

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D. Security Records and Communications
Division would remain basically the same, but
there would be increased emphasis on█████ com-
puters, and the microfiche program. In view of
the fact that Personnel Security Division would
be handling all clearances, overt and covert,
SR&CD would eliminate the "covert" file system.
The number of security volumes would depend
strictly on the amount of material that need be
filed.

E. If Security Research Staff is abolished
at some point in the future, there might be some
advantage in establishing a small Counterintelli-
gence Unit, no more than one or two people, and
assign it to the office of the ADD/PSI, or possi-
bly to the Chief, Personnel Security Division.
The key point is that this unit would operate close
to the flow of cases, CI would be built into the
system, and the senior Counterintelligence Special-
ist would monitor and otherwise utilize the services
of all Divisions in DDS/PSI. This unit might also
logically have responsibility for FBI liaison, but
the important point is that the unit would be operat-
ing for the Office of Security and not CI Staff. It
would not be responsible for the Thuermer/Pforzheimer
contacts, as the Support Division would handle any
and all special requests for data. Again, the over-
all intent is to eliminate the actual and philoso-
phical barriers between PSD and SRS, attempting to
salvage the best from both worlds.

3. With respect to the overall concept, the basic
theme would be to clarify and simplify areas of responsibility,
while encouraging the development of security generalists
rather than specialists. The DDS/PSI would be a large unit
of four main divisions, and possibly a very small counter-
intelligence unit. There might be some advantage in giving
the Assistant Deputy Director of Security for Personnel
Security and Investigations some prime responsibility for
managing or overseeing two of the Divisions, while the Deputy
Director would devote a little more attention to the remain-
ing Divisions. In effect, the #2 man would have a full time
job twelve months a year, and we would be in a defensible
position re potential charges of being top heavy with horse
holders.

4. I have already mentioned that no substantive change was being suggested in regard to DDS/PTOS. If however, a Counterintelligence Specialist, or a Special Assistant for CI, is assigned to DDS/PSI, it might be an equally balanced approach to assign a Computer Specialist, or Special Assistant for Computer Matters, to DDS/PTOS to keep in close touch with rapidly advancing technology in the computer security field. In substance, ▆▆▆▆▆ is   25X1A more or less operating in this fashion at the present time, even though he does not have the formal title. His responsibilities do strike me as being somewhat above and beyond pure physical security.

5. There has already been a discussion of the interplay and overlap between the Executive and Planning Division with the Administration and Training Staff. ▆▆▆▆▆▆   25X1A

25X1A   ▆▆▆▆▆ has been working very closely with A&TS on the Program Call submission of 3 April 1973, and there will be increased continuing responsibilities in monitoring our programs from a "money, personnel, and planning" standpoint. If Executive and Planning Division is abolished and/or combined with A&TS, you might wish to rename the unit "Management and Services" or "Management and Administration" to more accurately reflect these new responsibilities.

6. At this juncture, I would suggest we adopt a wait and see attitude in relation to the Special Security Center, keeping it under the cognizance of the Acting Executive Officer at this point. There are some specific functions, however, which might more logically be transferred to other elements of the Office of Security, dependent upon future developments. We might wish to rethink the entire concept of the Special Security Center in terms of it coming under   25X1A the Office of Security. In any case, the ▆▆▆▆▆ Working Group is working on this, and the situation might be resolved through the natural course of events.

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OFFICE OF SECURITY

Management & Administration———————— Director of Security ——————————— Executive Officer
Deputy Director of Security

Special Security Center

CI Specialist

Deputy Director of Security for
Personnel Security & Investigations
Assistant Deputy Director of Security
for Personnel Security & Investigations

Deputy Director of Security for
Physical, Technical & Overseas
Security
Assistant Deputy Director of————————Computer
Security for Physical, Technical   Specialist
& Overseas Security

| Personnel Security Division | Investigations & Polygraph Division | Support Division | Security Records & Communications Division | Physical Security Division | Overseas Security Support Division | Technical Division |

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The following pertinent information has been extracted from the Security Program of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1941-68, Volume I, An Overview. The specific sections site the source pages.

I. Historical Background on Organization

Since, historically, security had been a command function, many of the early considerations were related to identifying those aspects of security which would be best performed by a centralized security authority. Of necessity, early consideration of the centralized security authority were primarily concerned with the security selection of personnel, and this function has remained the principal activity of the Office of Security. The extensive investigative organization required to support this function, however, provided a personnel base which could be channeled into other areas of security support, resulting in the development of a professional security corps, able to operate as an important part of the Agency's overall mission.

The first 20 years of the Agency's existence were marked by many political and social changes. These have brought about changes in the nature of the threat, thereby resulting in changes in the overall pattern of security counteraction. (pp. 14-15)

II. Personnel Selection

The security screening of personnel for employment or other use was a major preoccupation of I&SO from 1947 to 1954. The Agency was rapidly expanding its personnel and activities both domestically and abroad.

Within I&SO the exercise of the security screening function was divided between the Security Division and the Special Security Division. The Security Division performed I&SO security clearance responsibility for all overt and semi-covert applicants, and, in addition, for those individuals used under overt contracts, overt intelligence sources, and domestic guard and char force employees. Additionally, they performed separate assessments related to the individual being provided access to Special Intelligence Information,

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and provided security indoctrination to personnel prior
to overseas assignment. The Special Security Division
<u>shared with the Clandestine Services</u> responsibility
related to the clearance or approval of individuals to
be employed or used by the Agency under covert circum-
stances. (The division of responsibility between the
Special Security Division and the Clandestine Services,
is reflected in ███████████ last revised 17 July <u>1959</u>).   25X1A
(pp. 90-91)

III.   Polygraph Program

Although the first use of the polygraph within CIA was
related to the security screening processes, its value
to CIA operational activities was quickly recognized.

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IV.   Counterintelligence

Late in 1949 a small CI Staff was established in I&SO to
maintain continuing vigilance against possible penetra-
tion of CIA by agents inimical to the interests of the
United States. On 12 August 1952, the CI Staff was
redesignated the Security Research Staff (SRS), at which
time it took over functions of the Technical Research
Staff of I&SO related to experimentation with equipments
and techniques to be used to counter penetration of CIA
by foreign intelligence operatives through its personnel.
Much of the early experimentation in the use of the poly-
graph as an aid to the personnel security screening pro-
cesses was conducted in SRS.

The CI Staff of I&SO and SRS, which consisted of no more
than 15 employees during the 1949-54 period, conducted a
program of continuing research to identify possible

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patterns of penetration of CIA through its personnel
and also maintained vigilance related to potential or
actual personnel security risks within the Agency. To
this end, fruitful liaison was maintained with other
intelligence and security segments of the Federal govern-
ment (including the FBI) and with the Metropolitan Police
Department in Washington. In November 1952, the Chief,
I&SO directed that one representative each be designated
within the Security Division and the Special Security
Division to review current personnel security investiga-
tive cases from the standpoint of possible penetration
efforts and to coordinate where appropriate with SRS.
I&SO continued to compile its own indices related to
suspect persons and organizations and thereby added to
the Agency's overall counterintelligence knowledge.
(pp. 108, 109, 110)

V.   Investigations and Operational Support

Following a survey conducted by the Agency's Management
Staff, the Security Office was reorganized in December
1954. The survey recommended a reorganization of the
Office to provide two functional deputy directors in
addition to the existing Director and Deputy Director.
Each of the new deputy directors would exercise specific
jurisdiction over a principal operating component of the
Office--namely, personnel and physical security support
on the one hand, and investigations and operational
security support on the other.

The Deputy Director for Investigations and Operational
Support (DD/IOS) supervised the activities of the Security
25X1A   Support Division █████████████████████████   The
Security Support Division was divided into the Investiga-
tions Branch and Operational Support Branch, with the
former's activities related to the security screening of
personnel proposed for covert use, and the latter involved
in all other matters of support to covert activities of
the Agency.

In October 1956, there was a reorganization of the Inves-
tigations Branch of the Security Support Division along
general geographical rather than functional lines. The
resulting "desk" breakdown within the Branch (IB-1,
Europe; IB-2, Far East; IB-3, Western Hemisphere; in
addition to the U-2 Project and IB-4, International

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Organization) was structured to accommodate its organ-
ization to that of the operating components of the Agency.
(Comment: A more factual statement might be that it was
structured to accommodate the Clandestine Services.)
IB-5 (the "open" desk) had no security clearance respon-
sibilities, but instead serviced the investigative require-
ments of the Personnel Security Division, transmitting
them to the field offices for action.

In September 1962, the organizational composition of the
Investigations Division (raised to Division status in
1961) of DD/IOS was again altered, primarily to accommo-
date the increase of Agency activities related to pro-
prietary organizations and intelligence collection
through technical means necessitating gross industrial
research and development programs. The Division was   25X1A
redivided into four Branches: ID/1 (all covert DDP
security clearance or ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮
organizations); ID/2 ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮
ID/3 (previously referred to as the "open" desk); and
ID/4 (Covert R&D programs of interest to the Deputy
Director for Research.)

A great influence on Office of Security organizational
adjustments during this period were suggestions and
recommendations contained in the report of the Inspec-
tor General's Survey of the Office of Security of
December 1960, although the full extent of the sugges-
tions were not adopted. . . . Within the IOS Directorate,
a continuity of effort could be traced back through the
Special Security Division to SSU at the end of World
War II. The IG report also noted that in 1947 the SSD
was brought theoretically into a unified Agency security
component; but actually the unification effort did not
result in merger, but rather in two separate systems
under a unified command. Internal procedures were
developed over the years gave effect to, and solidified,
this separation of interests.

The IG's report stated that experience had shown that
it was not necessary to have a complete separation of
covert and overt support functions. . . . The IG
suggested a reorganization of the Office of Security
along strictly functional lines without regard of separa-
tion of covert and overt support; for example, a Per-
sonnel Security Division, an Investigations Division, a
Technical Division (to include both the polygraph and
the technical countermeasures functions) and a Security
Operations Division. (pp. 122-128, 133-134)

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FIGURE 1

OFFICE OF SECURITY

December 1968

Director of Security
Deputy Director of Security

Administration
and Training Staff

Security
Research Staff

Executive Staff

Special Security
Center

Executive & Planning
Division

DD of Security
for Personnel Security

DD of Security for
Investigations & Operational Support

DD of Security for
Physical, Technical
and Overseas Security

ADD of Security
for Personnel Security

ADD of Security for
Investigations & Operational Support

Alien
Affairs
Staff

ADD of Security for
Physical, Technical
and Overseas Security

Personnel Security
Division

Interrogation
Research
Division

Investigations
Division

Operational
Support
Division

Physical Security
Division

Overseas
Security
Support
Division

Security Records and
Communications Division

█████████

Special Activities
Division

Technical
Division

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FIGURE 2

December 1946

OFFICE OF
SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Control   Executive   Operations   Plans

Personnel   Admin
Section   Section   M/C

| Western European Branch | Northern European Branch | Central European Branch | South Eastern European Branch | Arican Branch | Middle East Branch | Far East Branch | Latin American Branch | Training Branch | Source Control Branch | Specia Proje Bran |

Projects Support Division
P&A CIG

| Secret Section | Special Security Section | Personnel Procurement Section | Communications Section | Special Funds Section | Transportation & Supply Section |

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FIGURE 3

SECURITY OFFICE

1 December 1954

Director of Security
Deputy Director of Security
Executive Officer

| Admin. & Training Staff | Alien Affairs Staff | | Security Control Staff | Security Research Staff |

| Security Division | Inspection Staff | Special Security Division |

| Physical Security Branch | Personnel Security Branch | Interrogation Research Branch | | Special Referral Branch | Operations Branch | Cover Branch | |

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| Require-ments Section | Appraisal Section | Records Section | Research Section | | Covert Records Section | Corres. Section | Projects Section | Covert Security Section |

| | Operational Clearance Section | Open Section | Operational Support/ SI Section |

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FIGURE 4

SECURITY OFFICE ORGANIZATION CHART

5 December 1954

DIRECTOR OF SECURITY

Policy Staff —————— Deputy Director of Security —————— Inspection
Staff

Executive Officer

Security Research
Staff

Alien Affairs
Staff

Administration and Training
Staff

Deputy Director for Personnel
and Physical Support

Deputy Director for Investigations
and Operational Support

Personnel Security
Division

Physical Security
Division

Security Support
Division

Interrogation
search Branch

Technical
Branch

Investigative
Branch

Clearance
Branch

Building
Security
Branch

Correspondent
and
Records Branch

Employee
tivity Branch

Physical
Survey Branch

Operational
Support Branch

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FIGURE 5

OFFICE OF SECURITY

June 1963

DIRECTOR
OF SECURITY
Deputy Director
of Security

Executive
Staff

Special Security
Center

Security Research
Staff

Alien Affairs
Staff

Administration
and Training Staff

Deputy Director for
Personnel and Physical
Support

Deputy Director for
Investigations and Operational
Support

Personnel Security
Division

Physical Security
Division

Operational Support
Division

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Technical Security
Division

Interrogation
Research
Division

Investigations
Division

Security Records
Division

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O F F I C E   O F   S E C U R I T Y

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                    ┌──────────────────────────┐
                    │  Director of Security     │          ┌──────────────┐
                    │  ------------------        │──────────│  Inspection  │
                    │  Deputy Director          │          │  Staff       │
                    └──────────────────────────┘          └──────────────┘
          ┌──────────────┐
          │  Executive   │
          │  Officer     │
          └──────────────┘
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| Administrative & Training Staff | Policy Staff | | Alien Affairs Staff | Security Research Staff |

| Foreign Support Staff | Deputy Director for Personnel and Physical Security | | Deputy Director for Investigations & Operational Support | Coordination and Review Staff |

| Personnel Security Division | Interrogation Research Division | Physical Security Division | Security Records Division | Security Support Division | ▮▮▮▮ |

Fig. 1

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III. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

A. General

1. The organization of the Office of Security as of the date of the inspection is reflected in the chart on the facing page. In general the Office is divided into three major areas consisting of the Office of the Director with six supporting staff units, and two operational areas under the Deputy Director for Personnel and Physical Security and the Deputy Director for Investigations and Operational Support.

2. At the time of our previous inspection of this office (1954) the organization structure consisted basically of three operating divisions reporting directly to the Director of Security. At the risk of over-simplification, these can be described briefly as the Security Division which was responsible for overt clearances and related matters, the Special Security Division which was responsible for investigations and covert activities, and an Inspection Division which was responsible for certain inspection and survey functions. The Inspection Division has now ceased to exist as a command entity, but the general separation of overt and covert activities continues in substantially the same form. The Security Division has now become the Office of the Deputy Director for Personnel and Physical Security (PPS), and the Special Security Division has evolved into the Office of the Deputy Director for Investigations and Operational Support (IOS). Thus, IOS might be termed the covert security service, and PPS the overt. The general structure of the four larger staffs

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has remained relatively unchanged, although there have been some
modifications and the Inspection Staff has been created as a new one-
man unit reporting to the Director of Security.

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
B.   The Organizational Structure

1.   The present organizational arrangement can best be described
as semi-functional. That is, the basic allocation of duties at the
division level is on a functional basis, but there are modifications
and exceptions attributable to the historical isolation of covert
activities. Within IOS a continuity of effort can be traced back
through the Special Security Division to the Strategic Services Unit
at the end of World War II. In 1947 the SSD was brought into the
theoretically unified security component known as the Office of the
Executive for Inspection and Security, which subsequently dropped
the inspection function and became the present day Office of Security.
Actually, however, the unification effort did not result in merger,
but rather two separate systems under a single command. The internal
procedures which have developed over the years give effect to and
solidify this separation of interests. In other sections of this
report we have cited instances of unnecessary coordination which
serve no purpose other than recognition of assigned perogatives. For

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example, until quite recently both IOS and PPS maintained their own separate records systems. These have now been combined into a single Security Records Division, which is a step in the right direction, but here again the integration has not yet been carried to its logical conclusion.

2. We believe that the experience of recent years has proved that it is not necessary to have a complete separation of covert and overt support functions. The polygraph unit (IRD) is one of the best managed components of the Office of Security, and it is a fully integrated unit capable of providing flexible support to overt and covert activities alike. We believe that other sections of the Office of Security could be integrated in similar manner and with similar success, particularly those engaged in the analysis of personnel security information. We also believe that in the normal course of events, with the changing situations and the rotation of personnel, there would be a gradual realization that a duplication of systems to support covert and overt activities separately is inefficient and wasteful of supervisory personnel. What is needed is a controlled acceleration of the natural process of consolidation, since this is the only way to obtain maximum utilization of personnel. We believe that the Director of Security does not fully recognize the degree to which his personal leadership and that of his deputy have been responsible for the success of the security mission, and will be responsible for the immediate future. The objective now should be to develop an effective system of management which is not so thoroughly dependent upon the individual performance of one or two people.

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                          ┌─────────────────────┐
                          │ Director of Security │          ┌ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ┐
                          ├─────────────────────┤          
                          │   Deputy Director    │─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ┆   Security Review Panel   ┆
                          ├─────────────────────┤          
                          │   Staff Assistants   │          └ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ┘
                          └─────────────────────┘
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| Special Security Staff | Research Staff | COPS | | Executive Officer |

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                                                                ┌──────────┐   ┌────────┐
                                                                │ Records  │   │ Admin  │
                                                                │ Division │   │ Staff  │
                                                                └──────────┘   └────────┘
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| Personnel Security Division | Physical Security Division | Investigations Division | Technical Division | Security Operations Division |

Fig. 2

3. The principal functions of the Office of Security are easily identifiable, and they form the natural basis for an internal system of management. These functions are Personnel Security, Physical Security, Investigations, Technical Support, and Operational Security Support. The staff functions are also rather clearly defined, although we support the conclusion that the Special Research Staff should continue as a separate entity even though its function is not of a purely staff nature. The chart shown as Figure 2 on the facing page is not intended as a proposed organizational chart, but rather as a graphic illustration of a possible alignment of functions. Each of the major divisions should be under the supervision of a chief with the rank of GS-16, and the general allocation of functions should be about as follows:

a. The Personnel Security Division should be responsible for the clearance of all covert and overt personnel and related activities.

b. The Physical Security Division should be responsible for all physical security activities except audio countermeasures.

c. The Investigations Division should be responsible for   **25X1A**
all investigative activity, ██████████████████████████ headquarters, except the investigation of physical security violations.

d. The Technical Division should be responsible for the polygraph program and the audio countermeasures program. We realize that one of these is basically concerned with personnel security and the other with physical security, but we believe that the degree of

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specialization involved, the aptitudes and the psychological attitudes of the specialists themselves, and the highly technical nature of both programs result in a degree of compatibility not found between these units and the other orthodox security units.

e. The Security Operations Division should be responsible for all operational support programs such as alien affairs, safehouses, post office boxes, coordination of security components attached to operating divisions of the DD/P and the DD/I, etc., and for coordinating with the Investigation Division those requirements which are to be implemented at field stations.

f. The Special Security Staff is new nomenclature for the existing Special Research Staff.

g. The Research Staff should be responsible for conducting basic research in security matters, security criteria, etc., and for coordination of technical research. (In this instance the term "research" is used in the normal sense rather than to indicate a review and analysis in depth of personnel security information.)

h. The Executive Officer should be the management officer for the Director of Security, responsible for the coordination of all activities not specifically related to a substantive security program, including records management and general administration.

i. The Staff Assistants in the immediate office of the Director of Security should handle matters heretofore delegated to the one-man and two-man staffs and sections or assigned on a case officer basis to security officers in one of the divisions.

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4. While we recognize the theory leading to the grouping of activities under two functional Deputy Directors of Security (to minimize the number of subordinates reporting directly to the Director of Security), we do not believe that these theories have been borne out in practice. The very nature of the security mission and the personal responsibilities of the Director of Security dictate that he keep himself fully informed, and the delegations of authorities to IOS and PPS must be with this understanding. The Deputies for IOS and PPS are not, and could not be, regarded as deputies who may at their discretion act on behalf of the Director of Security. We did not identify any delegation of authority which established an effective point of decision below the Director of Security which could not as easily have been made to a division chief. On the other hand, "security" is composed of a number of different elements and these cannot be completely separated. The span of supervision of the Director of Security cannot be extended to all of the functional groups, even though he must be fully aware of significant happenings. We believe that the weakness of the system of deputy directors lies in the fact that it does not resolve the command problem but strengthens the separation of functions. That is, they provide day-to-day guidance to division chiefs who do not really need such "super-supervision" and must still refer really important decisions to the Director of Security anyway. Further, the two deputies have specific areas of responsibility and all questions involving overlapping areas must be resolved at the upper level.

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5. In view of the above, we believe that the most effective delegation of responsibility for day-to-day operations would be to the chiefs of the operational divisions, and that the major need at the secondary level is for an effective coordinator of command responsibilities which are not limited to a single division's area of interest. In order to achieve this, a Chief of Operations should be an executive agent of the Director of Security for the coordination of all operational matters. Extreme care should be taken to avoid the creation of a bureaucracy at this level, which could easily happen if the position becomes one of function rather than leadership. We view this position as one of a single officer with broad command authorities, responsible for all activities of the Office of Security except those reserved to the Director of Security or delegated to the Executive Officer. During his absence the responsibilities of the Chief of Operations should be temporarily transferred to the Deputy Director of Security rather than to a subordinate officer temporarily brought up from one of the divisions on an "Acting" basis.

6. We recognize that the conclusions drawn above are too broad to be regarded as a detailed blueprint for reorganization, but rather that they establish the requirement for additional study in greater depth. Since this study would be a long-range undertaking and necessarily lead to a consideration of substantive security matters, we feel that it should be conducted by a personal designee of the Deputy Director (Support), and that the individual should be assigned to the Office of Security on an indefinite basis for this purpose.

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Recommendation No. 1:

The Deputy Director (Support) assign a qualified representative to the Office of Security to conduct a comprehensive and substantive survey and submit specific reorganization proposals to the Director of Security.

C. Office of the Director of Security

1. Although there has been an increase in the general assignment of responsibilities over the years, the very nature of the security mission requires that the Director of Security be fully aware of even minute details. For this reason the management of the component is an extremely tight group. In theory the Director of Security and his principal deputy constitute a level of senior supervision and policy guidance for the next command echelon, but in practice they provide closer supervision and personally participate in many of its activities. As examples, the Director of Security personally supervises some of the more sensitive operations, and the Deputy Director is permanent Chairman of the USIB Security Committee. The span of supervision is thus theoretically limited to the functional deputies, but the actual span of leadership extends into the most remote areas of the office.

2. The Executive Officer is the "office manager" of the Office of Security. He is generally responsible for the coordination of all non-operational activities and has been engaged in certain aspects of planning for the new building. He is concerned with the refinement of Security Career Service and personnel procedures and is the chairman of the Senior Grades Panel. He is the Executive Officer of the Security Patrol which has been established for protection of Agency

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25 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT   : Comments on the Office of Security Survey

1. Set forth below are my comments on the Office of Security
Survey. The comments are set forth in the same order as listed in
Tabs 1, 2 and 3 of the Executive Staff Folder on this subject.

TAB 1 - ITEM 1 - SRD

I see no reason to move SRD to another component unless
it is part of a larger move designed to accomplish another
purpose. It appears logical that eventually the Clearance
Center and SRD should be combined, but this too would be
part of a larger move.

TAB 1 - ITEM 2 - GENERAL

I feel that the Office of Security Registry idea is a good one,
but it would require further study. I would recommend that
the Task Force suggested by the Executive Staff be appointed.

ITEM 3 - FSS

As you are aware, I do not feel that the Foreign Support
Staff is serving the purpose originally intended. Whether
this is due to the personnel involved or the structure of
positions I do not know, but it is probably both. My in-
clination would be to abolish the Foreign Support Staff and
place the personnel actions with A&TS, the writing of
cables with the Registry, the cable briefings with the
Executive Staff, and liaison with the various divisions on

overseas security with PPS, possibly with the Special Assistant.

ITEM 4 - GENERAL

The problem of briefing dependents under sixteen years of age is a difficult one. In some cases it would be wise, in others not so wise. Too much depends on the maturity of the children. I believe that we should probably continue our present policy - authorizing the employee to brief a child at a point that he feels appropriate.

TAB 2 - ITEM 1 - GENERAL

The problem of following the activities of disaffected or disgruntled employees appears to me to lie more in the area of the Personnel Security Division rather than the Security Research Staff. This would tend to put SRS in the chain of command and away from CI research. In addition, representatives of the PPS side of the house sit on the panel which considers such employees. I would recommend the responsibility remain with PSD.

ITEM 2 - GENERAL

I feel that there should be a central point for the handling of crank mail. I have no strong feelings as to where this should be, but above all, the name should be recorded in SRD so that it will come to light. I have no strong feelings on this particular suggestion.

ITEM 3 - GENERAL

I feel that the counter-intelligence function of the Office of Security should be centralized in one office. I recommend that the CI Support Desk be transferred to SRS. I suggest that we carefully review the possibility of moving some portion of the Protective Branch activities to SRS if, in fact, there is a need to maintail these activities. I have

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not seen any positive results on the effects of the Protective
Branch and I do not know that their function is a valid one.
I feel that SRS should furnish the information utilized in the
denied area briefings, but feel that PSD should give the
briefings. I also agree that CI information in the Office of
Security should be furnished to SRS.

ITEM 4 - Executive Staff

In regard to leaks of classified information, I feel that this
is best handled in SRS as opposed to Executive Staff.

ITEM 5 - SRS

Case studies should be done by SRS and the Information
Digest appears to be the best vehicle for publication of
these case studies.

TAB 3 - ITEM 1 - GENERAL

There is a great deal of history involved in the allegation
that there is a duplication of effort between preliminary
review and ID/3. In most cases, these two sections look
at the same piece of paper, but they do so for different
purposes. I am convinced that some sort of preliminary
review section is necessary in PSD. I am also convinced
that ID/3 should schedule all assignments to the field. I
would recommend the following guidelines be followed.
In any case where a background investigation is required
this should be so indicated by the Preliminary Review
Section and all scheduling should be done by ID/3. This
system is being applied in staff cases and should be ex-
tended to include all of the cases where background in-
vestigation is required. In other cases, such as
reinvestigation cases or cases which do not require a full
investigation, the extent of coverage can be indicated by
the Preliminary Review Section. ID/3 would then be in

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a position to expand the coverage if they feel they can do so economically but they could not reduce the coverage without coordination with the Preliminary Review Section.

ITEM 2 - Alien Affairs Staff

The proposal to move the Alien Affairs Staff under the DD/IOS is an old one. This Staff operates virtually independently and it does not really matter whether they operate as a staff or as a part of IOS with this exception; if the group operates under IOS it would enable IOS to furnish backup personnel to fill in when professional or clerical personnel are on leave. In addition, it would enable IOS to follow the defector picture to ensure the security of movement and housing of such defectors.

The Chief, Alien Affairs Staff opposes this move, primarily on the basis that his position as a Staff Chief gives him stature. His position may or may not be valid, but I personally feel that it is not particularly strong.

In summary, I do not feel that it makes much difference where the Alien Affairs Staff fits into the TO. I think it will work better under IOS if it can be done as a part of a larger reorganization and would not affect the morale of the Staff.

ITEM 3 - SPECIAL SECURITY CENTER

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I personally feel that the Chief of this Staff, ▉▉▉▉▉ should serve on COMOR and act as TSO. If ▉▉▉▉▉ were transferred or he retired, this would undoubtedly be done immediately. If it is done at the present time, it

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will have an affect on ▉▉▉▉▉ and possibly on his Staff. My suggestion on this is to wait until the Center is separated from the rest of the Staff and at that time,

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transfer the COMOR membership and the TSO position to ▉▉▉▉▉

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ITEM 4 - INTERROGATION RESEARCH DIVISION

I feel that the best solution to this problem is a better re-investigation program. If IOS were able to become more current in this program, the problem would be solved. I would recommend that IOS be requested to come up with a plan for improving service on the reinvestigation program and when this is accomplished, the other problem would be solved.

2. These are my comments on the problems raised. I would suggest that we hear all sides to the issues and you make your decision later. The decisions could come in the form of a Directive from you to effect the changes decided upon.

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Deputy Director of Security